MANUAL FOR MEDIA

COVERAGE OF ISSUES RELATED TO

VIOLENT
EXTREMISM

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MANUAL FOR MEDIA

COVERAGE OF ISSUES RELATED TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM

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INTRODUCTION

When speaking about media and radicalization (2009:109), Andrew Hoskins and Andrew O'Loughlin noted: "there are no general signs of violent extremism, its distinctive certain profile or a typical way to it". However, they did not deny the existence of violent extremism and radicalism, but underlined the complexity of the issue and the difficulty of talking about it in particular in the context of media.

The interrelationship of media and violent extremism is often described with the word "symbiotic" which underlines that, one side the media is obligated to cover cases of ideologically motivated violence unobtrusively, and on the other side one of the abuser's main objectives may be to attract the attention of national media to him/her (Spencer 2012). There might be a grain of truth in this comparison, but at the same time it is a simplification of the reality because one of the primary duties of media is to disseminate information, no matter the topic: whether it is about terrorism, crimes committed by Neo-Nazis or any kind of crime committed by an individual's motive.

Guidelines for reporting on terrorism issues published by the Georgian Charter of Journalistic Ethics correctly notes that "the Community has the right to access of information about terrorism and to stay informed about the expected threats; however, the media is responsible to not unwillingly become the supporter or circulator of terrorists' statements and appeals" (qartia.ge, 2019).

This very recommendation of the Georgian Charter of Journalistic Ethics is underpinned as a guideline in the present handbook; it will attempt to speak about the interrelationship of media and violent extremism from both a theoretical, as well as practical point of view, in the scope of the Georgian context. This handbook is for journalists, for professionals working in media, for activists, for the students of mass communications and for other interested persons, for whom it is vital to know how the media should cover the issues connected with the violent extremism, so as to not unwillingly become a supporter of the people and groups involved in violent extremism, and to keep the community informed.

It should be noted in the beginning that this handbook will pay special attention to not only perceived religiously motivated terrorism as the manifestation of violent extremism, but also to radical far-right groups and Neo-Nazi unions which have been remarkably active in recent years in Georgia. These forms of radicalization differ from each other in many ways; however, they are similar in some ways too, such as in utilizing methods of violence.

The processes following violent extremism challenge not only the State, concrete community groups or society in general, but also the media. When covering terrorism or radical far-right groups', the media should not only appease the public interest and provide society with accurate, verifiable information, but also it should respect humans' fundamental rights, persons' personal lives and avoid threats of community groups' stereotyping and discrimination. A journalist should be careful when working on such sensitive issues to not make heroes out of abusers and to not contribute to their glorification.

Taking into account all the above mentioned, the present handbook is divided into three parts. The first part carefully deals with the features of the theoretical concepts, including terms such as terrorism, radicalization, and extremism and so on. These concepts are not words of neutral value; when using them we include certain concrete issues or individuals with a nuanced meaning, which is why it is important to always remember to use such terms with great caution. The first part of the handbook will pay attention to the interrelationship of media and terrorism, also media and Neo-Nazi groups on a theoretical level. The handbook first part will also review literature on these topics and will inform the readers of the Georgian context as it relates to terrorism, i.e. radical far-right groups.

The second part of the handbook is more practical in purpose. Every subchapter consists of three parts: a review of existing international recommendations when covering issues of violent radicalism, issue coverage with concrete examples from media, and questions to be raised for discussion.

At the end of the handbook, there is a short explanatory dictionary of the terminology that is often employed when covering issues of terrorist and Neo-Nazi groups, and which are sometimes characterized by con-

textual ambiguity. The terms used in the dictionary are based on various sources and such will be indicated at the end of each explanation.

It is suffice to say that a manual of this size could not fully address all the problematic issues that occur when covering violent extremism and radicalization. For example, this handbook avoids detailed reviews of such topics such as: communication between a journalist and the victim of violence, media working for de-radicalization, human difficulties and challenges which journalists often face and must bear in mind when working on sensitive issues, and so on. We hope that this handbook will give an extra push to the thus-accrued initial knowledge in the Georgian reality in order to cover the issues connected with violent extremism and radicalization at high standards, and to support the launch of professional discussions on the concrete topics linked with this issue.

1. RADICALIZATION AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM

The terms which will be used frequently in the handbook are not only descriptive, neutral terms, they are mostly dependent on context and as they are called in social science and scientific philosophy, "They are essentially controversial concepts" (Allier 1955). The essentially controversial concepts formulated by the Scottish scientist and philosopher Walter Allier mean the following: "Such words bear not neutral but evaluative meaning, they highlight complex issues and granting a certain evaluation to these issues depends on variable circumstances. Accordingly, they are not subject to interpretation and they do not have one commonly recognized meaning. For example, such concepts are "Democracy", "Social Justice, "Art" and so on. Thus, controversial concepts may acquire different meanings in a different time, space and society" (ibid).

The phrases and words which describe individuals or community groups in media, academic or public spaces can be considered as such terms. These terms will be covered in the second part of the handbook *Radicalization* and *(violent) Extremism.* However, before we discuss the coverage of these issues in media, it is necessary to highlight the theoretical meaning of these terms.

It should be noted that the two above terms are not synonyms and they should not be equated with one another. As Barkaia and Janelidze, with the help of theoretical and empirical literature, point out in their research published in 2018, *Under the Gaze of Security: History, Politics and Religion in Pankisi Ravine:* "One of the problems of individual psychological-theological programs for the prevention of extremism is the equation of these term (plus terrorism). It is also underlined that there is no empirical data which could say with certainty that extremist ideology causes terrorism or that radicalization is the key prerequisite for terrorism" (Barkaia&Janelidze, 2018). The authors of the research start their discussion on the terminological problems with the following: "Sometimes it happens that the words we use to describe people or their way of life, that seem so obvious and harmless at first glance, reveal their internal contradiction and lose their

tint of clarity as soon as we ask the simple question connected with their meaning" (ibid, p.72). It happens exactly the same way when we speak about "radicalization".

Radicalization

Many authors note that the term "radicalization" has excessively been used in the last two decades as in media texts so in academic literature, though, very often it is not explained at all or its definition is obscure. This handbook critically looks at the use of the term "radicalization" when it is equaled to fundamentalism, indoctrination, extremist or violent acts (Alava et al. 2017). Coming out from the origin and history of the word "radicalization" the positive and negative understanding of this word should be underlined.

Radicalization can be understood as: "One's strengthening in his/her own knowledge, attitudes, values and belief which define his/her actions" (ibid). With this understanding, any revolutionary scientific theory or political struggle, (for example the supremacist movement, Marxism, Gandhi's fight against British colonialism, and so on), can be evaluated as "radical" (ibid). Thus, it is necessary to distinguish between radical *ideas* and radical *actions*, just the same between radical actions and radical *violent* actions.

In the definition of radicalization, the research report *Youth and Violent Extremism on Social Media* published by UNESCO relies on three different authors. Khosrokhavar (2014) defines the concept of the micro-level because he sees violent radicalization as the indoctrination of a person towards violent actions on an emotional and cognitive level (Alava et al.2017). According to his definition, extremist ideology supports the process of an individual's radicalization, which aims at changing the existed political, social and cultural order.

The German Sociologist Wilhelm Heitmeyer, who mostly studied far-right radicalism, uses Social Disintegration Theory when defining the term. According to his approach, the process of radicalization is the result of social discontent based on social conditions. He writes: "In practice, far-right extremist orientation is often based on the unfulfilled condition of democ-

racy, individual freedom, possibilities, and equality" (Heitmayer, 1989, p. 164-76 in Alava et al. 2017).

One more author, A. Schmidt, who researches radicalization on the individual and collective levels in ecosystem framework pays attention to political polarization (2013). This approach is distinguishable in that he often focuses on the issues that are often ignored, such as the disruption of democratic dialogue and citizens' involvement in it. He pays special attention to how the icons of "our" and "other" are created by dominating, collective ideological discussions (for example "kafirs" in Islamic radicalization, or "pigs "and "wild" among far-right radical groups).

Thus, Alava and others (Alava et al.) define three basic levels in radicalization conceptualism: a) an individual's striving to return to ideology meaning and fundaments; b) violently expressed ideology by an individual as a member of a group; and c) polarization of a social space and the seeking of scapegoatsfrom the collective "others" which is finalized with the actual, physical pursuit of individuals of the targeted group.

One more author, Asta Maskliunaite, offers a review of the existing theoretical knowledge of terrorist radicalization. She notes that: "Radicalization is a process by which a person acquires systems of belief which justify the use of violence in order to achieve social change accompanied with justification for using violent measures for achieving political objectives" (2015:9).

Radicalization is a process through which a person acquires a certain system of beliefs which justify the use of violence in order to effectuate social change as well as to achieve political objectives" (2015:9). Maskaliunaite underlines that radicalization is a process which may be stopped at any stage or can develop in a number of various ways. When involved in violent actions social connections bear an important influence, but ideology cannot be assumed a priori as a decisive factor for involving an individual in violent actions (ibid).

Kalias, Zeiger, and Ozturk (2018) define radicalization in connection with ultra-far-right groups as a cognitive and behavioral gradual, dynamic transformation which directs an individual and groups against basic public values and which strives towards fundamental changes using radical measures.

After having defined and discussed radicalization above, it is necessary for radicalization, violent radicalization (legitimization of violence), and violent acts to be distinguished and clearly defined as well (Alava et al.2017). However, the present handbook aims to devote more attention to the coverage of violent radicalization and violent acts rather than to elucidate the radicalization process itself. According to Borum, involvement in violent radicalization and terrorism should be observed as an active, psycho-social process which consists of a minimum of three stages: a) the involvement process; b) involvement-participation in the terrorist actions; and c) exclusion (that may not mean deradicalization at all).

Extremism

A comprehensive understanding of the history of radicalization in closely linked with an understanding of violent extremism (VE). Just as with radicalization, there has been an increase in literature on violent extremism since the years 2004-2005(Barkaia&Janelidze 2018). The frequent use of these terms in the fight against global terrorism has occurred in parallel to the seeking of alternative ways to fight it. This occurred as a logical result of the announcement of the "War on Terror" after the terrorist act of September 11. Accordingly, the existing literature on violent extremism, in the same way as with radicalization, has been written in the context of fighting against it.

Though, as already mentioned violent extremism cannot be equated with the concept of radicalization, it is not a prerequisite for the radicalized individual to be involved in extremism; those who are involved in violent extremism may not be ideologically radicalized. As Andy Borum said: "Radicalization by development or reconciliation of extremist beliefs, which justifies the use of violence, may be one form of involvement in terrorism but it is not the only one" (2011:28).

As the political document published by the Georgian Center for Strategy and Development says, similar to radicalization there is no commonly recognized definition of violent extremism neither in academic literature nor in official documents (Goguadze 2018). The UN "Action plan of vio-

lent extremism" notes that: "Violent extremism is a serious threat for the UN (L.K) principles and objectives; it impedes peace and safety, human rights and sustainable development in the world. The above-mentioned phenomena are not new, nor even characteristic feature for a concrete region or culture".

In the document published by *Partnership for Conflict, Crime and Security Research* (PCCSR) which focuses on dealing with violent extremism by means of media and communication strategies, the above-mentioned phenomena are closely linked with identity-based violence (IBV) (Ferguson2016).Such violence in documents is explained as "the violence, motivated with hatred from crime to genocide against an individual or groups of people, (as perceived by the offender), according to their identity". PCCSR, in regards to violent extremism, notes that it is a union of actions, beliefs/imaginations, and strategies which supports or uses violence for political, ideological or identity reasons.

Accordingly, violent extremism ought not only be considered within the prismof Islamic violence.

Far-Right Groups

Over the past few decades, discussions about violent extremism have become more common in the context of far-right groups. Some researchers use the term "Far-Right Terrorism" (Koehler 2015). Media and international organizations' attention is less directed towards such violent extremism as they are considered to be separate occurrences.

In 2011, a group named the "National-Social Underground" was discovered in Germany. Members of the group killed 10 people and organized two explosions within ten years. During this period, they had gone entirely unnoticed. The same year, on the island Utoya, Norway, Andres Breivik killed seventy-seven people. In 2012, Michael Page killed 6 people in a Sikh temple in Wisconsin and in 2015 Dylann Roof killed 9 black worshippers at the African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina. Over the past decades, many such cases have been reported in

Western-Eastern Europe and Russia. Despite this, violent extremism motivated by far-right ideology is given far less attention in public debates in comparison to Islamic terrorism.

The concentration of public debates on such extremism isnonetheless difficult because of the complexity and diversity of the involved groups. As Kalias, Zeiger and Ozturk (2018) note, the term "far-right" is very troublesome to deal with as it unites ideologically, discursively and behaviorally diverse groups with those that may consist of non-violent, less violent and especially violent far-right groups. Thus, the term "radical far-right" is mostly used as an umbrella term that unites individuals and groups which support ultranationalist, anti-immigration, anti-gender, anti-multicultural and anti-globalist policies. Such groups can be observed in some national legislative bodies, traditional groups, organized religions and even on the football field.

The second part of this handbook pays unique attention to those aspects that display signs of violence on individuals and groups. These violent methods try to influence and/or repress so-called "others" through ideological politics and identity in an effort to banish them from the public space.

This handbook cannot offer an in-depth review of separate occasions of radical far-right groups' origin, founding and their rise in mainstream politics. Also, in this handbook, we cannot consider the theoretical literature about motivations and reasons of individuals' involvement in radicalism and extremism. Instead, the following sub-chapters will focus on the inter-relationship of media and terrorism, media and radical far-right groups. We will review the current situation in Georgia and the perspective of the State on this topic.

1.1. MEDIA AND TERRORISM

The interrelationship between media and terrorism for the last few decades has been well-studied in academic literature; the approaches, indeed, have been diverse. As one part of researchers note, there is a kind of "symbiotic" relationship between the two (Spencer, 2012). On one side, terrorism needs media to circulate information, on the other side media has always been attracted by tragic and dangerous stories and such topics are always announced at the beginning of news or appear on the first pages of websites (Archetti 2013).The other part of researchers direct their attention towards the interrelationship of media and authority in the context of terrorism and think that media is in harmony more with authority than with terrorism. Very often, it is in the interest of an authority to spread an atmosphere of fear and state of emergency (Archetti 2013&Altheide 2007). While others think that, in all these processes, media serves the interests of neither authority nor terrorists- they have their own interests in mind and the power to create desirable alternative realities (ibid).

The reason for this can be found in the explanation of the term "terrorism." Like in the case of radicalization and violent extremism, there is no commonly recognized definition of terrorism. In his review "*Media and Terrorism*," Bernaski highlights some important aspects of the definition of terrorism (2002). He takes the approaches of social sciences according to which terrorism is a socially constructed term, and it cannot be considered as a value-neutral term. Official institutional definitions are also incomplete; for example, according to the General Assembly of the UN, terrorism is:

"Criminal acts to establish terror and fear in the wider community, groups of people or in concrete individuals for political reasons. No matter with what political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnical, religious or other motives it will be justified". (Koh 2002:148; Koh 2002:148)

However, it should be noted as well that such a definition excludes the most famous historical terror; that is state-sanctioned terror (for example during the French revolution). That is why Paltski and Winson distinguish: a) state terrorism as that which is directed against a government's own

people: b) terrorism supported by a state that is directed towards the people of other counties; and c) insurgent terrorism that is implemented by non-governmental subjects. All these forms of terrorisms have one common feature: to spread terror as much as possible.

When speaking about the interrelationship of media and terrorism the factors of fear and terror are decisive in it. Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's famous quote best describes the first of the three approaches of the above researchers: "Media is the oxygen for terrorism". (Marthoz 2017). This approach is not new. Many scientists consider terrorism as a form of communication; that is, anything that people might watch, listen to or read can be formulated as an act (Archetti 2013). Alex Schmidt connected the rise of non-governmental terrorism with inventions of the rotary press and gunpowder. While according to Rapoport, (1984) terrorism existed before mass media and it used alternative ways to spread information, such as rumors. All aforementioned researchers underline that acts of terrorism without media will lose a fundamental component of their communication strategy and it will reach only to the victims of the terrorist acts and will stay beyond the public attention (Spencer 2012).

The role of media in relation to terrorism is not one-sided. For example, one of the leaders of Al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, noted after the death of Osama Bin Laden that more than half of what the US calls fighting against terrorism "happens in media battlefield , that is why we are involved in media fighting to win (Muslims') hearts and minds" (quoted Archetti 2013, 3). This one quote simultaneously recognizes the importance of media to terrorist organizations, and notes that the governments as well are involved in the fighting that goes on by means of media.

To exemplify this, Alteid pointed out that media played a large role in the promotion of terrorism by paying special attention to the fear and the uncertainty of the future provoked by George Bush's announcement to "fight against terrorism" after September 11. It was accepted without any criticism and covered inadequately (2007). As a result, fear became an integral part of everyday life thus helping the American government to strengthen institutional control mechanisms and control over citizens under the pretext of security. Additionally, stirring up fear on the part of the media by sometimes non-contextual and superficial coverage further

caused stereotypical attitudes to develop towards specific religious peoples, states or regions.

The fomentation of stereotype development, which is very often done by the media, can be considered one of many reasons why anti-immigration, Neo-Nazi groups began to emerge in the USA and in Europe; a result of which has been the strengthening of their positions in national politics. Furthermore, it gave push to such radical groups that pursue certain demographic groups in Western countries based on religion and ethnicity.

If the interrelationship of media and terrorism can be perceived as "oxygen" for terrorism on one side, and on the other side as a spreader of an atmosphere of terror and fear in order to widen the scales of security policy of a government, there leaves the question: should media refrain from covering terrorist acts and terrorism in general?

When speaking about British society, Spencer (2012) has the following answer: "Any type of censorship to stop media from covering terrorist acts creates two kinds of problems – normative and practical. The author remarks that refraining from covering such acts brings into question one of the key characteristic features of democratic countries; that is, media freedom. As the British expert on issues of terrorism would say, if we sacrifice media to fighting against terrorism means we are enabling the terrorist groups to take away one of the fundamental features from the democratic society (Wilkinson 2000, quoted Spencer 2012).

As for the practical form of problems, this type of limitation is less pronounced, as the ways of spreading and attaining information have become much more diversified. At present, there is no need to have an institutionalized body, to which we would pay taxes and register in the governmental system, to produce media content. Social media and the augmentation of a number of digital platforms in one way enable us to decentralize the ways of information circulation, and in another way leaves only a technical device, and not the decision-makers, standing between the broadcaster and the viewer in order to spread information between them.

1.2. MEDIA AND RADICAL FAR-RIGHT GROUPS

At present, far-right extremism and radical far-right groups are undergoing a drastic rise across the whole world, especially in Europe and in the USA. According to a 2019 report of the American NGO Anti-Defamation League, in 2018 alone around 50 people were killed in the country (US). Compared to the index of the previous year this is a 35% increase. According to the same report, in the last decade attacks by far-right extremists have killed 3 times more people in the USA than terrorist acts implemented by Jihadists (ADL 2019).

Near the end of the 1980s, the German professor of political science Klaus Von Beyme expressed his worries that there was nearly no comparative scientific literature about radical far-right political groups. Now, approximately thirty years later, it can be said that no other political orientation group has received so much academic attention as radical far-right groups have (Ellinas 2010). This attention, however, is typically directed towards far-right political parties which have in turn become stronger in the Western countries over the past few decades. They have placed themselves in institutional bodies, become politically active in many of these countries, and a part of them even participates in the formation of newer legislative bodies and governments. The Polish researcher Vladimir Sierakowski remarked in his article published at the beginning of 2018 that populist far-right forces are in the governments of seven out of 15 countries of Western Europe, they are in coalition governments of two countries, and in three countries they are the main oppositional forces (Sierakowski, 2018).

It should be clarified not all populist political parties are far-right ones, and not all populist far-right parties can be described as radical. The programs of radical far-right groups and movements are mainly characterized by an ideological platform based on ethno-nationalist roots that are, as Rydgren describes, directed towards the strengthening of the nation by increasing its homogeneity and returning to its traditional values (Rydgren 2018). In addition, their activities are often of a populist nature as they are directed against the governing and privileged classes i.e. the establishment. Thus, one of the main characteristics of these groups is

ethno-nationalistic xenophobia and anti-establishment populism (ibid). Moreover, all the above mentioned is often reflected in actions against migrant groups, as well as against groups having liberal views and supporting gender emancipation. In some cases, these actions may be of a radically violent character. Regardless, one sign that all these groups have in common is that they may be against superpower unions such as the EU, NATO, or multinational corporations.

If we return again to the interrelationship of media and radical far-right groups, some part of scientists pay attention to the role of media as the means for fomenting the rise of far-right populist political parties. Antonis Ellinas describes approaches when the American media is blamed for the excessive coverage of Donald Trump that resulted in the increase of his popularity. Similarly, the Dutch media is often blamed for making the leader of the Freedom Political Party Geert Wilders an influential political figure. The French media is often blamed for promoting the leader of the National Front, Marine Le Pen. The British media is likewise criticized for being excessively loyal to the leader of the independence party (UKIP) Nigel Farage (Ellinas 2018).

However, Ellinas points out that there is less research in the area of scientific literature that individually studies the influence of concrete media content on the behaviors of voters when covering the aforementioned parties. Such research is mostly conducted within the frameworks of Agenda Setting and Framing. The above frameworks mainly concentrate on how radical populist political parties create agendas for media, how they define topics to be covered, and then how and in what respects media covers them.

The role of media is especially interesting in its covering of marginal political groups. Such groups are typically characterized by a lack of organizational infrastructure and financial resources in order to bring their own opinions to their potential supporters and a wider audience. Media is avital resource for political actors in general but for such radical groups which lack financial resources for political ads, the media is of double importance. That is why as soon as these groups decide to emerge from the underground; they try to attract the attention of the media by any means necessary.

Ellinas identifies three issues in which media can play a decisive role either in weakening or strengthening such groups. These issues are: **recognition, giving push, and legitimization** (2018). First of all, the covering by media of these groups may make them think that they are important actors in the public space (Gamson&Wolfsfeld 1993). Devoted or increased attention from the side of the media may both give them push to become a more serious force as well as to enable common citizens to discover and join them. The third issue is legitimization, which might be especially relevant in post-Fascist Europe where there existed a kind of taboo about the involvement of fascist or Neo-Nazi groups in public politics after WWII. Their frequent appearance in the public space and their normalization violates this taboo and accordingly the involvement of similar groups in politics becomes further legitimized.

However, for clarification it should be pointed out that to entirely blame the rise of such groups on the media creates an incomplete picture. In order for the media to play any major role in such groups, (such as weakening or strengthening), there should exist a political environment for it to enable such groups to utilize media. As Ellinas says, media has more influence on new or small-sized far-right radical groups than on old and well-established unions in the public space (2018).

In addition, when speaking about said influence, not only is the frequency, but also the type of coverage is important. If radical far-right groups are negatively covered and if they are associated with violence, it may play a decisive role in the strengthening of these groups and making their leaders influential. Such examples exist in Germany and Great Britain. In the 1980s, Republicaner's election failure was mostly caused by the connection of the political group with Nazism by the tabloid *Build* (Art 2007).

New technologies play their own role in the formation of radical and extremist far-right groups. At present, primarily social and online media play a role in the rise of such groups. Digital media both gives such groups cheaper and simpler ways of organization, as well as accelerations the normalization of their bold and open appearance in the online space into the wider community. The amount of media which openly supports the existence of such groups, or due to commercial reasons

do not refuse to place such material in order to attract as many users as possible, has considerably increased. They do not publish the materials associated with identity, ideology or political hatred.

1.3. THE GEORGIAN CONTEXT

On January 23, 2019, the government of Georgia approved the National Strategy on Fight Against Terrorism. The document prepared by the Permanent Interagency Commission under the auspices of the State Security Service of Georgia (State Security Service of Georgia, 2019), only covers the threats from terrorism and extremism, but also states that although Georgia is not considered a high-risk country from the point of view of terrorist attacks, it still often faces various types of challenges because of processes going on in the North Caucasus, the Middle-East, and central Asia.

According to the document, in recent years many Georgian citizens from different regions of the country have joined terrorist groups and some of them even have become leaders of such groups[1]. The document also points out that some groups in Georgia may share the ideology of certain terrorist organizations, although the document does not specify which group is meant. It should be noted that the Strategy document allows the possibility that the persons involved in terrorism and extremism may belong to a certain ethnic and religious group, at the same time Georgia does not assign a terrorism label or extremism to any religious, ethnic group, or nation.

The Georgian Law Against Terrorism defines it in the following way:

> **Terrorism –** *violence or the threat of using violence against physical individuals or legal entities, damage or devastation, or threat of damage and devastation of buildings, transport, communications and other material units by using explosive, nuclear, chemical, biological*

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1 read more about this topic in the policy document *of the Georgian Center for Strategy and Development 2018, "Improvement of mechanism against radicalization and violent extremism in Georgia".*

> *or other materials that are dangerous for human life or health, or the kidnapping of a human and taking him/her hostage in order to make the authority or any of its bodies or an international organization take action or to refrain from a certain action that is against the interest of the terrorists.*

However, unlike the above law, the Strategy document gives an explanation in connection with extremism and terrorism.

> ***Extremism-****the union of ideas, an ideology that does not recognize the principle of equality of humans, supports hatred, intolerance, violence, endangers the democratic order of the country, and the supremacy of law.*

> ***Radicalization-****the process during which a person, when expressing his/her ideas, may go beyond the limits of law and get involved in terrorist and/or extremist activities. In the above process, the person is ready to agree and/or to use violent methods if need-be for the ideological purposes which he/she is supporting.*

As the political document issued in 2015 of the Georgian Reforms Association says, "Georgia had never faced the danger of Islamic terrorism until 2014, if terrorist threats from the occupied territories of Georgia are not counted" (Goguadze&Kapanadze 2015, 3). In the last few years, the issue of terrorism has become real in a few cases. In 2017, during the terrorist operation on Gabriel Salosi Street, which went on for 20 hours, ended lethally for a few people, among them law enforcers.

From 2015-2018 there were online video appeals recorded by ISIS including threats against Georgians. Goguadze and Kapanadze, in regards to the above political document, speak about the possible challenges Georgia may face if ISIS were to become active in the Caucasus region, specifically because of its recruitment of Georgian citizens (2015).

Besides terrorism and the extremism connected with it, the Georgian strategy against terrorism says "some community groups or organization" speaks about hatred or support violence is of an extremist character by

its activity (p.13).As it is pointed out in the Strategy Document, Georgia is against such ideas/ideologies and it will not allow such ideas to be carried out and become reality. It is interesting that there are only these two sentences about the above "some public groups and organizations. "The document does not specify which groups are meant, what ideology they bear, or what kind of extremist activity they lead.

Although the documents issued by the State does not name these groups, coming from the recent history of Georgia for those people who are actively involved in the current events it is not hard to identify them. It is nearly impossible to find academic information about the radical groups' history which try to repress and banish this or that group in Georgia, their reconstruction is only possible by the media in order to spread information and reports of various NGOs[2].

Radicalized, anti-democrat more-or-less organized groups can be identified in the recent history of Georgia and namely since the 1990s when a group which existed within the Georgian Church started to chase various religious unions and even attack them physically. Later, the priest who was leading that group was anathematized by the Orthodox Church and it continued to exist independently until after the Rose Revolution took over, when the head of the group was imprisoned.

Another group of the Orthodox Church which was formed in the mid-90s attracted media attention when they protested the presentation of a book by a Georgian author and then raided a Halloween celebration. Since those events, this group periodically has attracted public interest with their aggressive appeals and by confronting specific (liberal, feminist, and queer) groups.

Since 2012, queer groups have become the objects of interest of groups united with aggressive, fundamental, religious motives. This reached its peak on May 17 in 2013 (on theInternational Day Against Homophobia), when tens of thousands of people organized by some religious persons and other radical groups attacked approximately 30 LGBT activists and their supporters (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender).

Parallel with these events, groups were created on the internetmulti-

2 we will maximally try to avoid the naming of concrete groups and people because the ideological-political characteristic features of extremist and radical far-right groups are more important than the names.

plied which openly supported and spread such Neo-Nazi and Fascist ideology.

The above groups are distinguished with drastically anti-liberal agenda; they often attack various individuals (for example queer peoples) with their xenophobic online content on the social media pages of liberal media means.

The groups bearing sharply expressed nationalist and anti-immigration ideology have also been formulated. They have organized xenophobic processions several times and have tried to attack the private property of Arab, Turkish and Iranian businessmen living in Georgia. There were also cases of physical abuse of black people on racial grounds which entailed the arrest of some people.

The last case when far-right and anti-liberal groups tried to demonstrate their power in the public space was in May 2018, when the police raided several night clubs and people started to protest in the street police repressive actions and strict drug policy. These people were opposed by nationalist and fascist ideology unions. The law enforcers managed to ease the confrontation between the demonstrators and counter-demonstrators, though from the point of view of their appearing in public space this case was distinguished from previous ones with its scale and size. Later, police arrested one of the leaders of these groups for unlawful acquisition, possession and carrying of a firearm (Tabula 2018).

At the end of 2018, Vitali Sarapov was killed near a bar in Tbilisi. According to eyewitnesses, and as media broadcasted, Sarapov was attacked because he was speaking Russian. Later it was found out that the accused people were members of a Neo-Nazi group. Later their guilt was determined and the case was retried by the article under premeditated murder for racial, religious, national or ethnical intolerance (NetGazeti, 2018).

The above brief review is far from the issues' full reconstruction, though it is obvious that radical far-right groups are rising and becoming more active. Supposedly, Georgian reporters will often have to broadcast and cover various issues about them. The second part of this handbook deals with the coverage of far-right radical, terrorist and extremist groups. It also it deals with possible ethical objection and difficulties when working on these topics.

2. MEDIA, TERRORISM AND COVERAGE OF GROUPS

The British former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's assertion that media and terrorism are interrelated became a kind of mantra when speaking about mass media and the groups connected with violent extremism, though PM Thatcher's opinion that publicity i.e. media became "oxygen for terrorism," is now opposed by some people in both academic and journalist circles. The Spanish theorist of communications Michel Rodrigo underlines that such an approach is superficial and says it is true that some terrorist acts are implemented for publicity, but a part of terrorists do not have such intent and many terrorist acts are kept to be secrets (Biernatzki 2002). During the Watergate and Pentagon recording the editor of "Washington Post," Catherine Graham said, "publicity may be oxygen for terrorists but the news is life-giving blood for freedom" (Marthoz 2017).

Thus, first of all, it should be underlined that the avoidance of coverage of violent groups does not address the problem at all. In the question – "Should we, or should we not, cover or not terrorists and Neo-Nazi groups?" – Journalists face a dilemma. In fact, the one question a journalist should answer when receiving each subsequent assignment is: "In what way should we cover terrorism and Neo-Nazi groups?" If we take into account the influx of information in which the reporters have to work, the people employed in active journalism may not often have the circumstances required to ask and think well about such a question. The objective of this handbook is to facilitate decision making for the journalist in the case that they have to cover a subsequent terrorist act or any Neo-Nazi's action motivated with racial hatred.

The following sub-chapters are based on recommendations and ethical norms of various organizations and institution will attempt to provide the reader with proper information about the most important issues when covering the violent extremism. Issues including but not limited to are: meaning of context and normalization or the danger of romanticizing, stereotypes, the damage caused by sensational coverage, possible complications during live, visual side of the story, complexity of terminology and comparatively new challenges caused by coverage of similar cases on

social media. The cases of terrorism and Neo-Nazi groups' coverage and relevant questions helpful in decision making from both local and international media will be given under each subchapter.

2.1. COVERAGE FRAME AND CONTEXT-DANGER OF NORMALIZATION

When covering the public damage caused by hate-motivated violent groups and their activities, it can be noted that providing information to users with context is of decisive importance. The directory "Terrorism and Media" for journalists published under the auspices of UNESCO, together with other aspects including ethic norms, law, protection of human rights and deliver of balanced information, devotes special attention to the context of terrorism-related issues (Marthoz 2017).

The directory in essence focuses on the framing of terrorism-related news or with which frame the journalist ought to cover the story. The explanation of framing theory of massive communications is widespread in various fields including media researches. The researchers define the Frame as, "interpretive structures which are used by journalists in order to put concrete cases in a wider context" (Norris, Kern & Just 2003: 10). The utilization of these frames defines the importance of the news is being covered. What a journalist or an editor will focus on when delivering news might have a decisive meaning of how the news about terrorism or Neo-Nazi groups will be perceived by the audience.

The coverage of the same news with different frames may have different results and may reflect differently on the population or various political circles. For example, if a journalist were to choose to focus on the ethnic, religious and/or racial signs of the violent perpetrator when covering a terrorist act and tries to attribute the cause from this point of view, it may endanger the other representatives of this ethnic, religious and/or racial group. If a media representative focuses on the peaceful cohabitation of various groups and the ways of achieving it, thus may avoid the stereotypical perception of a certain segment and may change the opposing environment to which the perpetrator of a violent act was striving.

The definition of news frame is dependent on covering or not covering concrete individuals, their hierarchy, their positions; who the respondent is, what type of images, words or epithets we use to describe them (this will be addressed in detail in the subchapters 2.6-2.7).

The journalists should convey the story in a broader context in order to support the creation of a positive idea about the target groups to which the radicalized and violent groups direct their actions or the groups the targeted individuals belong to.

Coverage of minority groups may negatively influence radicalization if the following is used:

» *The stereotypical frames*-connection between an individual's negative behavior and another individual's cultural-religious identity when these details have nothing in common with what happened.

» *Episodic frames*-when the story is not inserted in a broader context.

Coverage of a minority group may positively influence radicalization if the frame used is:

» Focuses mostly on general features of this or that risk factors;

» Shows the bigger picture: for example, will use statistics, experts' analyses, and other additional information.

Utilization of an *episodic frame* and avoidance of showing a wider picture may lead us to the **normalization** of violent actions- one of the main journalistic mistakes when covering terrorism-related or Neo-Nazi groups' actions. Diversification of the sources to receive information, the universality of social media and increased competition to attract the attention of readers/viewers have changed the routine and structure of working on the news.

Very often journalists cover the news briefly without any context or additional information and dryly. Fragmentarily covered news stays in information users' consciousness as ordinary violence and if frequently repeated becomes normalized.

"The complexity of writing such a story is that the reader should be given a full image when reading this one story, to say in other words if I am a reader and I know nothing about Neo-Nazis I should get the context from this story in order to know everything I need" – remarks the American media researcher,

the executive director of an American Press Institute and the author of many handbooks, Tom Rosenstiel, in an interview with Vox (Turner 2017).

The volume of published materials on the topic should not mislead us. The article might be lengthy but it might not show the context or may be written in a frame that will not enable us to fully understand the problem.

Description of a Case

The New York Times-*A Voice of Hate in America's Heartland*
November 25, 2017

Rosensteil's interview was published when the internationally recognized publisher New York Times published an article initially titled: "In America's Heartland, Nazi Supporter in Neighborhood." A bit later the newspaper decided to correct its headline and named it to: "A Voice of Hate in America's Heartland". The article dealt with the everyday life of an ordinary American Nazi, Ohio resident Tony Hovater and his wife. The article told the readers about the man's way of life, attitudes, strivings, and future plans.

Some extracts from the article:

[1] It was a weeknight at Applebee's in Huber Heights, a suburb of Dayton, a few weeks before the wedding. The couple, who live in nearby New Carlisle, was shoulder-to-shoulder at a table, young and in love. He was in a plain T-shirt, she in a sleeveless jean jacket. She ordered the boneless wings. Her parents had met him; she said and approved of the match. The wedding would be small. Some of her best friends were going to be there. "A lot of girls are not really into politics," she said.

In Ohio, amid the row crops and rolling hills, the Olive Gardens, andSteak'n'Shakes, Mr. Hovater's presence can make hardly a ripple. He is the Nazi sympathizer next door, polite and low-key at a time the old boundaries of accepted political activity can seem alarmingly in flux. Most Americans would be disgusted and baffled by his casually approving remarks about Hitler, disdain for democracy and belief that the races are better off separate. But his tattoos are innocuous pop-culture references: a slice of cherry pie adorns one arm, an homage to the

TV show "Twin Peaks." He says he prefers to spread the gospel of white nationalism with satire. He is a big "Seinfeld" fan.

The portrait published by the New York Times gave a detailed description of Tony Hovater's life from Metal band membership firstly until libertarianism and then Neo-Nazi. The sources of an article were: Tony Hovater, his fiancé, Matthew Heimbach, the leader of the Neo-Nazi group "Traditionalist Labor Party", Marlyn Mayo-the senior researcher Anti-Defamation League's Center on Extremism (only one quote from Mayo is used in the article). The only person who more or less made a negative comment about Hovater was his ex-member of his metal band who said he regretted he knew Hovater. Instead, the article told about his new friends including the 2017 march in Charlottesville, North Carolina where the people of Caucasian descent and white supremacist faith made a public demonstration which resulted in the death of one individual.

[2] After he attended the Charlottesville rally, in which a white nationalist plowed his car into a group of left-wing protesters, killing one of them, Mr. Hovater wrote that he was proud of the comrades who joined him there: "We made history. Hail victory. "In German, "Hail victory" is "Sieg heil."

The article includes three photos:
- » Tony Hovater in front of his own house;
- » A fragment of his bookshelf;
- » Hovater in a supermarket.

The article ends in the following way:

[3] The pasta was ready. Mrs. Hovater talked about how frightening it was this summer to watch from home as the Charlottesville rally spun out of control. Mr. Hovater said he was glad the movement had grown.
They spoke about their future – about moving to a bigger place, about their honeymoon, about having kids.

Questions for Discussion:
  » Why do you think the newspaper changed the headline of the article after its initial publication?
  » In your observation, and relying on the above quotes, what frame of cover did the journalist when writing about Tony Hovater? Would you use the same frame or not? How could the portrait of Hovater have been written in another way?
  » Relying on the above quotes, to what extent could the journalist provide relevant information about a Neo-Nazi person; and, was the information provided in an appropriate context?
  » Were the sources used by the journalist sufficient? Whom would you add or subtract as a source?
  » What mood does a detailed description of the everyday life of the Hovater's invite?
  » Why do you think the writing of the article was problematic and why did it provoke large-scale criticism from society?

2.2. THE THREAT OF ROMANTICIZATION AND HEROIZATION

Terrorist actions that are directed towards a population aim not only to establish fear among the populace, but also to attract new supporters. For this purpose, they use social media as well as traditional media in order to spread narratives of their bravery and heroism (Marthoz 2017).   As with terrorists, some Neo-Nazi and Neo-Fascist groups try different ways to evoke self-sacrifice and sympathy in a wider community. Media should not air them in achieving the said goal.

The "Handbook on Coverage of Terrorism" published by the Georgian Charter of Journalistic Ethics definitely indicates that:
  » The members of terrorist groups should not be represented as heroes, they should not be assigned such features that will represent them as "brave warriors" because if covered so it may provoke a positive attitude to their actions.

» A big part of the coverage should not be devoted to the leaders of terrorist organizations, their way of life, objectives and implemented actions. If they are covered in this frame it may evoke positive attitudes about them.

The same principles may be used in regards to Neo-Nazi and other types of violent groups. Media should avoid representing their violent actions that are mostly motivated with hateagainst community groups or their individual members as the legitimate and fair fight to achieve a certain result. Instead, media should put forward the necessity of peaceful cohabitation and underline that the violent action for the achievement of political or other types of goals is not justified.

Besides this, irrelevant coverage of violent acts may encourage the youth for radicalization if these acts are represented as exciting, heroic, and interesting adventures.

Terrorists, when staging certain events, try to influence the community for this purpose. They use various devices of mass communication and among the goals of these communications may be: demonstration of government helplessness, gaining the public's sympathy, promotion of polarization and radicalization in the community, and what is most important – one of the goals of their action may be the representation of their violent activities as heroism (Bassiouni1981 quoted Archetti 2013).

The media should at the very least try to avoid helping them if they cannot actively hamper such groups in carrying out their goals. In this case, the frame and context of coverage as well as technological accuracy, chosen vocabulary, and visualization are of great importance. We will talk widely about these in the following subchapters.

Description of a Case

Kviris Palitra – *Tarkhan Batirashvili-Jihadist "Red General" from Pankisi*

June 23, 2014

People from all over the world joined the Levant and Iraqi Islamic Country (the same ISIS) recognized as a terrorist organization by the

UN. As indicated in the *Georgian National Strategy on Fight against Terrorism*, dozens of citizens of Georgia had become members of this organization. One of them was granted a certain military rank and attracted the attention of international media: Tarkhan Batirashvili, also known as Abu Omar Al Shishan. The Georgian media's attention was periodically directed at Batirashvili. Several times, news of his death was spread as well.

On June 23, 2014, the newspaper "Kviris Palitra" published the article "*Tarkhan Batirashvili – Jihadist" Red General" from Pankisi*" on its website. The article briefly reviews the pre-history of his life before becoming a member of ISIS, his life in Georgia, and the course he took from his service in the Georgian military unit serving in ISIS. The article tells the story of his life without relying on any source and delivers his fighting career to readers.

Some extracts from the "Kviris Palitra" article:

[1] *"He knew well that among other mujahideen he could find his place only with more cruelty and principality. At first, his group members were his fighting Chechen friends against the Russians in Dagestan. Batirashvili attracted the attention of the rebel leaders in Syria when he took over Northern Syria in a very short period of time, and the most important was the taking over of a military base and especially an airbase".*

[2] *"One day when Omar Al-Shishan was conducting a special military operation against the governmental forces in Deri Zora province, the formerly loyal Kurds saw their chance and attacked the Mujahideen camps in the city Al-Bab.When Batirashvili heard the news he had to suspend the combat operation and return to help companions. His fighters, after a 300kilometer blitzkrieg maneuver, recaptured the city Al-Bab. After recapturing this city, all of Syria heard his words," I will never abandon my sisters and brothers because they are dear to me". After Al-Bab, his closest entourage thought that Al-Shishan, who famous for his cruelty, would not pity*

a soul and would seek revenge for his killed soldiers (he lost 500 mujahideen). On the contrary, Al-Shishan called for his rivals – if they would surrender their weapons and would repent, they would stay alive. Some of the field officers perceived the commander's humanity negatively and claimed that his softness was the fault of his Christianity…"

[3] "The national committee stubbornly assured that among the killed soldiers there was Abu Omar Al-Shishan but lately this information was not confirmed-the powerful "Red General" recorded some video appeals calling for the Muslims to create a Caliphate on Syria-Iraqi territory. Soon, his complainants appeared among Chechen and Kist fighters who expressed their dissatisfaction when they returned home they claimed that Batirashvili lived like a king and that he moved everywhere accompanied by guards of a dozen fighters and armed vehicles constructed by Iranian specialists (?!) and that he was using their guys as cannon-fodder."

Questions for Discussion:

» What feelings does the headline of the article provoke in you? If you were to read just the headline would you ever think that the article was about the cruelest member of the terrorist organization?

» What words does the journalist use to describe Tarkhan Batirashvili? What qualities do these words indicate?

» After reading the first quote, how would you describe Batirashvili?

» The beginning of the second paragraph ["One day when Omar Al Shishan was conducting a special military operation against the governmental forces in Deri Zora province."] How similar is it to a journalist narrative, or does it remind you of any other genre? Which one?

» What did you think about him when you read about Batirashvili's actions described by the journalist?

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» What does the journalist rely on? Who is his source? Are the details published specified?
» What is your attitude towards this type of repeatedly published unconfirmed information about Batirashvili's death as given in the third extract?
» Relying on the three extracts from the article, what kind of image does it create in the reader about Batirashvili?
» What kind of information would the audience receive about Tarkhan Batirashvili after reading only this article? How much of this information coincides with reality?
» For increased accuracy, what kind of narrative and what words should have been used to describe Batirashvili?

2.3. ABUSER'S APPEALS AND SOWING PANIC AMONG THE POPULATION

On September 19, 1995, an American domestic terrorist known by the epithet "The Unabomber," sent press releases to the largest two US newspapers, The Washington Post and The New York Times, demanding them to be published saying that he would refrain from violent actions if his demand were fulfilled. How would media have to act in this situation? Would it accept or reject the demand which could create a danger for many people lives? These issues had been actively discussed in journalistic circles for many years (Marthoz 2017).

When speaking about the sowing panic among the population, one unacceptable yet widespread journalistic mistake is to live broadcast or upload the abusers' unedited video appeals onto websites. It does not matter if such a video appeal is recorded by a terrorist, Neo-Nazi or racist group as long as the videos contain threats towards a certain part of the population; Media professionals advise us to always avoid the direct broadcasting of such materials without editing.

Indeed, this does not mean entirely refusing to broadcast such content. As the guideline principles of the handbook "Coverage of Terrorism-Related Issues" of the Georgian Chart of Journalistic Ethic says:

> » The community has the right to receive terrorism-related information and know about possible threats; though the media has the obligation to not unwillingly facilitate the reporting of terrorism-related content.

We are not talking about information censorship or avoiding the obligation to inform the viewers, we merely claim that media should not become the platform for violent groups as their involuntary ally.

The appeals, whether in the form of video recording or press releases, may have different intentions that may include: the spreading of fear, the recruitment of supporters, and certain attacks against the State. Such videos and texts have value from as news, although experts' advice is instead for a body to prevent itself from broadcasting such materials. It is far better if media dissects such video appeals and uses only those parts which are valuable and useful for the news. The media should cut out the parts which contain propaganda and directly address or ask the target audience what they think about this appeal.

Other than videos containing threats, the media may possess videos that depict violence against a certain person or persons. The direct broadcasting of such videos or their uploading onto websites is likewise not desirable because it instills panic among the population; for other reasons as well it is not permitted. Spreading such materials by the media may encourage behaviors of an imitative nature and may encourage so-called "copy-cat" serial murders. For example, when in 2004 terrorists publicly beheaded several hostages in the Middle-East, similar instances were observed far from the Middle-East, in Haiti, and in a remote Thai village. The criminals who beheaded three police officers in Haiti called the operation "Bagdad." In Thailand, the beheading of Buddhist officials by the accused parties was understood to be an act of revenge against the violence used by the Muslim rebels (Nacos 2006).

Description of a Case

Palitra News – *"We Will Soon Behead You"*-Palitra News received a video wherein a Georgian ISIS group member threatens a Georgian authority figure.
August 6, 2018

For the last few years, ISIS members' video appeals have been broadcasted on across Georgian media with some instance in which the journalists themselves were reading the text of the appealing party. One Georgian media publication directly, without any editing, broadcasted one such video in August of 2018.

Palitra News directly, without any adulteration of the content broadcasted this video appeal for its viewers. After a brief introduction, the journalist reads the text aloud saying: *"The ISIS – Georgian group is broadcasting a video which contains threats and which we got quite by chance. The video includes Georgian subtitles where the group threatens a Georgian authority figure.* "Our warriors are ready to avenge this; we will soon behead you, we will kill you in your own homes," *says the video appeal. Supposedly the video was recorded two weeks ago. According to one report, the State Security Service of Georgia arrested a Georgian citizen, Malkhaz T., and the news about his arrest became public on Monday. Supposedly this citizen was connected with that group".* "Palitra News used the quote taken from the appeal "*We will soon behead you."*

The full video recording in the same form follows the introduction by the journalist as its creators originally recorded it with the intent of distribution. The text which is read in the recording says that the Georgians betrayed Muslims and unjustly killed them. According to the inscriptions, the footage shows people killed during the "lapankuri" special operation, their funeral and people mourning them. The text used in the video contains threats saying that they will kill the brothers and children of the Georgians, exactly as the Georgians did it. The video also shows footage of a counterterrorist operation carried out on Gabriel Salosi Street in which sever-

al people were killed. According to the Georgian authority, those people were planning a detonation in Tbilisi. The video's duration is over 4 minutes and, other than the introductory text, and there is no journalistic interference in the video whatsoever.

Questions for Discussion:

» Do you think that the headline of the video selected correctly follows all journalistic standards?
» What feelings does this video provoke in the viewer?
» Would you broadcast this video in the same format?
» What alternative forms could a journalist use to broadcast the information about the video?
» What kind of influence do you think the video content could have on general society?

2.4. LIVE BROADCASTING

On September 21, 2013, four masked men opened fire in a Westgate shopping mall In Nairobi, the capital of Kenya. During this attack more than 70 people died including over 60 citizens and five soldiers. The group Al-Shabaab took the responsibility for this attack. Around 200 people were wounded. In February 2014, representative of the Kenyan Defence Forces, Julius Karangi, declared that it was a mistake for the media to be allowed to live broadcast during the anti-terrorist operation. The live broadcast went on around for 48 hours and as he said that the media directly enabled the perpetrators to watch the planning of operation by the defence forces and anticipate their actions accordingly.

During terrorist attacks, the live broadcasting is an ordinary thing for much of media provided it will not hinder law enforcers' actions. The Media should not involuntarily aid the perpetrators, as in the Nairobi case. The decision to not allow live broadcasting during such instances may be motivated for one reason alone- a journalist's working to not create a cir-

cumstance which puts the lives of others in danger. Media representatives should always bear in mind the fact that the materials they broadcast are likely to be accessible to the people involved in the violent act. Regardless of the information including as to the implementation of the counterterrorist operation, images of the adjacent perimeter or footage taken from the air by helicopter or a drone should not be broadcast.

It is especially dangerous to live broadcast events when abusers take citizens hostages, or when reporters are very close to the location of the events when the police and members of Special Forces are undergoing the counterterrorist operation. At this moment, any media mistake may result in danger for the life of the people involved. We have many such examples from international media experience.

On November 22, 1974, four attackers hijacked a British Airways airplane. They demanded the release of 13 people accused of terrorism by the Egyptian government and 2 by the Dutch authority. The Egyptian authority declared they would appease the demand and were going to free the people accused of terrorism.   At this time, journalist reported that there were no freed prisoners on board the plane and that the hijackers were tricked. The attackers heard this and killed one of the passengers (Cohen-Almagor 2005).

It is very important for your activity:
» Not to create a circumstance which puts the lives of others in danger;
» Not to hinder emergency and security operations;
» Not to provide terrorists with sensitive and important information.

When the media broadcasts the kidnapping of people it is not recommended to broadcast information about law defenders' tactics and location. The media should deliver information about the danger, but it should inhibit the police from working effectively. That is why it is better not to live broadcast phone and video calls with kidnappers and to not show the faces of law officers but to cover the faces during the following broadcasts. (Conseil de L'Audiovisual de Catalunya, 2016).

At present these issues are even more acute when any ordinary citizen has access to social media or a live-streaming device. Media should take more cautious efforts not to support the spreading of sensitive informa-

tion by the citizenry. That is why user-generated content should undergo adulteration by media professionals and only then be broadcasted via secure information channels. The challenges caused by social media will be discussed in-depth in subchapter 2.8.

It should be also noted that unspecified information may cause more damage in such crisis situations than it would have otherwise. There is distinct possibility that it may cause a rapid change of behaviour in the audience; for example, they may leave the territory, refer to unprofessional advice for the purpose of defence, sow panic in other environments, and so on.

Media entities should also take into consideration, when specifying the number and identities of the casualties, it is of utmost to, cover the names and surnames of the injured and deceased immediately after and during the start of the crisis situation because the families and loved ones of the casualties may not know yet about what happened.

Description of a Case

Rustavi 2 – *"Explosion and Shooting Sounds on Gabriel Salosi Street"* November21-22, 2017

On November 21, 2017, the State Security Service of Georgia conducted a special operation, in which during the confrontation between the law enforcers and those present the building, one law officer was killed and four were wounded. As for those the building three were killed and one was arrested (Tabula.ge 2018). Soon after the launch of the special operation, Georgian media actively began live broadcasting. The special operation that went on for 20 hours was broadcasted live by nearly every TV channel. Online media was even offered to viewers by live broadcasting via Facebook Live. The journalists said that it was hard to get specific information from officials because there was not a single press speaker who would deliver detailed information to the journalists. In addition, journalists obeyed the law enforcement agency and did not enter the forbidden territory.

The TV Channel "Rustavi-2" started live broadcasting on November 21. Their journalists provided viewers with unspecified information and brief on-site events. Over the course of the day, the cameraman was showing close-up views of the law defenders mobilized near the building and the reporter would periodically announce which law enforcement officer was entering the confined perimeter.

The next day, early in the morning, the live broadcast started again with journalists reporting from the territory adjacent to the building of the events showed footage from the yard where the law defenders were mobilized. Journalists also broadcasted the comments of the evacuated neighbours. Footage showed where and how the members of Special Forces were moving.

The next broadcast aired a phone comment one of the residents who lived in the apartment building. The resident was speaking about the incompetence of the police and was talking about the fear and nervousness experiences. The TV channel did not cover or blur the faces of the mobilized law defenders. The cameraman was trying to maximally show close-up views of the entrance where the suspects were. Journalists had attempted to interview the ambulance brigade, which was trying to enter the perimeter of the attack. Journalists even announced from where the ambulance was going to enter. Together with other TV channels, the journalist of the aforementioned TV Channel tried to gain an interview with neighbours lived on the territory during the events of the special operation. Said TV channel aired "exclusive" footage taken from the neighbouring building which showed the apartment in which the suspects inhabited. In one clip of footage, a journalist even moved some policemen to show how the ambulance was leaving the territory. The journalists even attempted to place a microphone into the rescue team vehicle in order to clarify why they were trying to enter the place of attack.

Questions for Discussion:

» Do you think is it necessary to live broadcast from the territory of special counterterrorist operations?

» Is there any public interest in what happened?

» Should a journalist spread unspecified information in such a situation?

» Is it justifiable or not to show the law officers when live broadcasting?

» Should a TV channel broadcast the deployment of Special Forces and the police and the trajectory of their movements?

» How do you evaluate the efforts of the journalist trying to receive information from the people seated in the ambulance and in the rescue service vehicle?

» Do you think the photographers are permitted to show close-up footage during such operations?

» What details is a journalist permitted to describe when broadcasting live?

» How can a journalist specify information in the case when no official bodies are disseminating information about the ongoing counter-terrorist operation?

» If a journalist is permitted onto the territory adjacent to an operation and he/she can freely live broadcast the ongoing situation, should he or she herself/himself refrain from doing so?

» What alternative ways are there to broadcast ongoing event and yet, at the same time, not hinder the operation?

2.5. STEREOTYPES

At such moments, when a recent terrorist attack has just occurred or any group motivated with political or ideological designs commits a crime to intimidate the public or a particular segment of society, it is absolutely crucial just how and from whom the public will get the primary information about the event. Many aspects of a broadcast, such as with which tone a journalist uses on TV or on online media, the precise cho-

sen words and images are important for the following two reasons. Firstly, it may avoid sowing panic among the population, (as was focused on it when in regards to live broadcastings). Secondly, it can prevent us from seeking a scapegoat from among the frightened population and from becoming abusive towards the group – a representative of which can be connected in any way with the perpetrators of the violence and blamed.

Thus, the information spread by journalists should be free from vague and unspecified informational dissemination, stereotypical approaches, and from making hasty conclusions. These ensure that a balanced, fact-based information broadcast for the population and will assure that some of the demographic groups do not become the victims of stigmatization. The handbook of the Georgian Charter of Journalistic Ethic says:

> » Connection of a negative action with the origin and religious belief of the participating people is irrelevant. Such information only stirs up negative stereotypes and supports stigmatization. Instead, show a full situation and underline that no ethnic or religious values are in any relationship with terrorism. Present the experts and analytics' evaluation, statistics or any other relevant information which will represent the problem in whole.

A hasty and uninformed conclusion may lead us to an unnecessary stereotyping, everyone who commits a crime is not a terrorist and everyone who implements a terrorist act cannot be connected with a big terrorist organization that is why it is not necessary to sow panic in the population in every criminal case.

In 2017, Khalid Masood, 52, living in Britain crashed his car into a group of approximately 50 people on the adjacent territory to Westminster Palace. Four of them were lethally injured and immediately after the car attack, he lunged at a police officer with a knife. Masood died at the very place of the crime. The media at once initiated speculations that Masood was connected with ISIS, but the police and investigating bodies failed to find any connection between Masood and any terrorist organization.

When criticizing the action of media and authority, the British author and a journalist Simon Jenkins wrote:" Do not fill the pages of newspapers the TV radio broadcasts with such words as 'fear', 'terrible', 'maniac', 'monster.' Do

not give a reason to the Mayor of the city to come shouting 'don't panic,' it is not necessary for the experts to speculate on TV as to the topics, 'what ISIS wants, 'and, 'how difficult it is to defend yourself from such attacks?' If you represent London as the place for filming a horror movie then do not search for a home-grown Osama Ben Laden. To say it in other words, do not pretend as if you are 'acting as usual' when you do the opposite".

The handbooks dealing with the dangers of terrorism, radicalization and Neo-Nazi groups typically emphasize that the media should do anything to avoid connecting an act of terror with any religious, ethnic or cultural past (Marthoz217, Terratoolkit).

Description of a Case

The news about a crime committed by the citizens of the various counties is often aired by the media and posted on various websites. In such cases, the media becomes even more active if the citizens of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa become involved.

On June 30, 2017, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia announced that law officers arrested a citizen of Iran in Akhaltsikhe. The 51 years old suspect was accused of attempting to initiate sexual contact with five minors. On June 6, the court sentenced him to six years in prison. Information about this man's arrest and about the decision of the court on two different websites is given below.

Alt Info-*Iranian Men Arrested in Akhaltsikhe for Attempting to Rape 5 Minor Boys*
June 30, 2017

An Iranian Men Arrested in Akhaltsikhe for attempting to initiate sexual contact with minors. The accused is 51 and works at one of the enterprises in Akhaltsikhe. He tried to trick five minor boys into sexual contact. At first, he tries to get to know them, to get their trust, and then he attempted to offer money and engage in sexual contact with them.

Saagento Pirvelli-*Iranian Sentenced to 6 years in Prison for Depraved Action*
June20, 2017

   The Akhaltsikhe regional courted sentenced a citizen of The Islamic Republic of Iran to six years in prison for depraving action with minors. The Akhaltsikhe regional court took into consideration all evidence presented by the prosecutors and sentenced H.K. the citizen of The Islamic Republic of Iran guilty according to the article 18-141 of the criminal code of Georgia (five episodes).

Questions for Discussion:

» What inconsistency can you see between the headline of Alt Info article and the text?

» When comparing the text and the headline, what kind of threat does an aggravation of a committed act by the media create when it indicates an effort to rape instead of an effort to engage in sexual contact?

» What inconsistency do you see between the headline and the text of Saagento Pirveli? (Envisage that in the story published by Saagento Pirveli the headline is written by the agency and the text is copied from the press release of the Prosecutor's Office of Georgia).

» Do you think it is appropriate when media focuses on the accused's religion, ethnical origin or race when a criminal act is committed? What kind of threat do you think is generated when the media links news on crime with the identity of a perpetrator?

» Based on the information provided in the texts above, what kind of impression is the reader left with towards the ethnic Iranians?

» Would it have been possible to cover this case in any alternative way?

2.6. THE VISUAL SIDE OF THE STORIES

In August 2013, a photo of Jokhar Tsarnaev, accused of the Boston Marathon bombing made the cover of the magazine "Rolling Stone. "In the photo he appeared with a naïve look, curly hair and a T-shirt and looked like an ordinary American teenager. The decision of the magazine to publish the photo was followed with an overwhelming response from both media circles and from the magazine's regular readers. Readers swarmed the social media accounts of the magazine and accused it of ennobling the criminal who had been found guilty in the murder of several people. The critics blamed the magazine for representing terrorism in a glamorous way and pointed out that Tsarnaev appeared like a rock star in that photo (New Yorker 2013).

At present, when greater attention is devoted to the publishing of audio-visual information and texts are being gradually reduced, it is becoming even more important what and how the media will publish visually. Most especially if it concerns not only fair and just representation, but also the publishing of shocking photos and video recordings which graphically show the capital punishment, the beheading of victims by violent extremist groups, and suicide bombers and so on.

This issue mostly is within the limits of the professional ethical field; however, media in France may be fined15 000 Euros for publishing images of victims of terrorist attacks. In other countries, the above ethical dilemmas are basically decided at the editorial policy level (Martoz, 2017).

The handbook for journalists published by UNESCO considers the editorial policy of several editions in this area; for example, the news agency "Agency France-Presse" refuses to publish videos showing the beheading of victims by abusers and it uses only certain footage from videos which will not insult the dignity of the dead. Furthermore, in case of the identification of victims, they try to publish photos of the deceased shot earlier in their life (Marthoz 201).

The British periodical The Guardian established some basic recommendations related to the publishing of videos of ISIS executing people in 2016 (Smith 2016):

» Do not use a video or a photo which will represent the perpetrator attractively: for example, when they are posing with hostages, weapons. Use audio materials sparingly.
» Use only close-up photo shots from the hostages' videos and post it at the end of an article rather than for it to appear at the beginning of the article.
» In the ideal case, the main image of a hostage or a victim should be a photo taken at another time and in another context.

The handbook of the Georgian Charter of the Journalistic Ethics also pays attention to the aspects of the news broadcasting. The handbook deals with normalization, as well as political and ethical subtexts of threats related to terrorism with visual means that follow the publishing of visual materials. The handbook underlines the responsibility of a journalist:
» He/she should not replicate the terrorists' calls and goals;
» He/she should not violate an individual's privacy and should prevent hurting people, particularly the victims and their loved ones.

Description of a Case

Rustavi2- *Exclusive: Photo Materials and Footages of Chataev's Body which Describes one more Terrorist's Liquidation*
December27, 2017

About one month after the aforementioned anti-terrorist operation conducted on Gabriel Salosi Street, the TV Channel Rustavi2 broadcasted reported:

"Ahmed Chataev has been liquidized. "Currier" obtained an exclusive photo which shows the liquidized Chataev. The photo also shows his foot prosthetic. Besides the photo materials, "Currier" also obtained exclusive video materials showing the liquidation of one of the people accused of terrorism during a special operation conducted on Gabriel Salosi Street".

Even today, it is not specified whether the liquidized person during the special operation was Ahmed Chataev or not. Accordingly, the news broadcasted by the TV channel truly had value be-

cause there was public interest and it had every reason to broadcast that issue.

The reporter before showing the photo on the TV screen pointed out: "We cannot blur or process the shocking material, as doing so would entirely devalue displaying the image, thus we would like to ask you to avoid children to watch it."

The reporter live broadcasting from the site of the operation also asked not to let children view, only after having already displayed the image, of Ahmad Chataev's dismembered parts of the body strewn about the scene. It was almost impossible to make anything out of the photo shown by Rustavi2. Only accumulated gathered blood and some parts of body sullied in mud could be seen, including a head which was decapitated from its body, as well as some bloody parts of his foot prosthetic.

In parallel to showing the above footage, the journalist repeated once again that the TV channel deliberately did not graphically process the photo because it would be hard to make out well.

After this, the TV channel broadcasted how one of the accused terrorists came out of the residential building armed and shooting in the direction of the law officers. Footage showed how a bullet struck him and he fell down in front of the armored vehicles. After few second later, what was likely a hand grenade detonated held in his hand. Just as with the images of Ahmed Chataev's dismembered body, these images were not graphically processed as well.

Questions for Discussion

» What kind of emotions would seeing this type of footage TV evoke in you as a viewer?

» Do you think viewing Ahmed Chataev's dismembered body parts added any value to the broadcast? What additional valuable information would the viewer gain?

» What kind of influence do you think showing such footage can have on the deceased persons' loved ones?

> » How do you think those people would react who might potentially sympathize with the neutralized terrorists on showing those graphically unprocessed footages?
> » What sort of impression do you think may be provoked by seeing the images of the liquidated individuals in those people who might potentially sympathize with them: to see how one person single-handedly fights against the armed special forces soldiers and then blows himself up himself after he is lethally wounded?
> » In what case can visually disturbing images can be aired in a broadcast or posted on a website?
> » How could you tell the above story without showing visually disturbing materials?

2.7. TERMINOLOGY

The words "terrorist," "terrorism," "and terrorist attack" are not meaningless terms. Most important journalistic handbooks and leading media organization-style manuals highlight that it is not the business of journalism to use such emotionally stimulating evaluative terms. Terrorism related issues are never one-dimensional; that is why a journalist may easily make a mistake when using such suggestive words.

In1970-80s, the Tupamaros National Liberation Movement involved in guerilla combat was declared by Uruguay's leadership to be a terrorist group while the members of the movement considered themselves to be fighters for the liberation of the country from dictatorial regime. The UNESCO handbook for journalists considers such cases a dilemma, and posits a question: How can political groups which are involved in terrorist acts in dictatorial or occupational conditions be considered – as members of a liberation movement or as terrorists (Marthoz 201)?

The information agency Reuters call the words "terrorist", "extremist," guerillas" and so on emotive words and points out that: "Some terms carry emotional resonance or are very controversial or vague, which is why they should be carefully used with particular neutrality and accuracy". The same

remark can be found in the BBC editorial guideline, which says that the word "terrorist" may be more a barrier rather than a helper for information in the understanding of a story (BBC 2019).

A very interesting remark is made in the document "Media *and Terrorism*" issued in 2005 by the Committee of Culture Science and Education of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, it says that an irrelevant use of the word "terrorism" in a so-called "normal" criminal case may represent it as heroism and attract attention with a negative understanding while those people who commit such acts try to stay anti-heroes (Jarab 2005). Many so-called terrorist acts are based on "ordinary" criminal behavior and not on political or ideological action; thus, they may be falsely represented in society as having a higher power and easily frighten the population.

The Charter of Journalistic Ethics lists the words that are better be used by journalists instead of "Terrorist act:"

- » "Explosion"
- » "Bombing"
- » "Shooting"
- » "Opening of fire"
- » "An armed person"
- » "Kidnapper"
- » "Attacker" and so on.

The Charter of Journalistic Ethics points out that journalists should avoid the use of the word "terrorist", but that, "the journalists at the same time should not replace the word 'terrorist' with another word when it is mentioned in the respondent's quote. It must be shown that this term is used by a source."

#WordsMatter is the name of a campaign that was launched in Great Britain by the survivors of various terrorist attacks (Davies 2019). This campaign calls for media not to use the terms which will represent the perpetrators of violent extremism as heroes or will legitimize their actions in any way. For example, we may often encounter the assertion that media should not use such terms as "Jihadi," "Mujahideen," "Caliphate," "ISIS or ISIL," and so on. One of the main arguments of this suggestion is that the people involved in violent extremism refer to themselves and their activity in this same way.

Media representatives should take into consideration that violent groups might be using such terminology in order to represent themselves as fighters for liberation, martyrs or oppressed peoples, and represent other controversial groups as threats to the community. They may try to marginalize and stigmatize certain people with specific markers (for example migrants, women, lesbians, gays, bisexuals, transsexuals, and so on). Media representatives should always indicate that this or that opinion is demarcated from their editorial policy and at the same time try not to use the abusers' vocabulary.

Description of a Case

Daily Mail-*From Smiling Kent Schoolboy to Murdering Jihadi*
March 24, 2017

In subchapter2.5 where the threat coming from stereotyping was discussed, the2017 case known as Westminster attack when 52-year-old Khalil Masood killed a number of people first with his car and then with a knife was mentioned. Below are quotes from an article of the British Daily Mail publication:

[1] "*From smiling Kent schoolboy to murdering jihadi. This is the first picture of the Westminster ISIS-inspired jihadi Khalid Masood as an adult in a police-released mugshot of the Westminster terrorist-as-school-friend reveals the popular footballer suffered "mild racism "for being the only black student".*

[2] "*This is the first picture of the Westminster ISIS-inspired jihadi Khalid Masood as an adult in a police mugshot released by the Scotland Yard today. The Met released his picture as part of a public appeal for information as officers try to find out if the extremist was acting alone or helped by a wider terror network in Britain".*

[3] "*Neighbors in Birmingham believe it is unlikely he was working alone and described him as a 'strange character' and called him 'the vampire' because he would only come out at night wearing all black".*

> *At the beginning of the current month, a 1000-page detailed research report named Birmingham as the terror capital of the world. From 1998 to 2015, there were 269 cases in which people were accused of Islamic terrorism and among people identified as suicide bombers, 49 of them were from the West Midlands.*

Questions for Discussion

» Characterize Khalid Masood based on the above information; what kind of portrait did the article create?
» In the above-quoted extracts, which words did you find controversial to use in journalistic texts?
» What kind of emotionally-loaded words do you think these words bear: "vampire," strange character," "Jihadist," "capital of terror"?
» What words could replace them with?
» Do you think the media ought to refer to the people involved in alleged terrorism using the same names and epithets as they call themselves or which their loved ones call them?

2.8. SOCIAL MEDIA

Since the year 2000, coinciding with the increasing popularity of social media and the other problematic issues like the coverage of violent radicalized groups, journalists have found themselves facing new challenges. The active use of Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and other platforms on one hand supports journalists, and on the other hand helps other radicalized groups in various aspects as well. In order for reporters to effectively use social media in their activities and to not unwillingly foment wider circulation of ideas of these radicalized groups, it is important to observe for what purposes these groups use social media.

As with terrorism so with far-right radicalization-related groups might use social media:

- » For self-organization and if they intend to entice new members (recruitment);
- » For the popularization of their activity and for the spreading of fear;
- » For the creation of a desirable narrative in their own image and for the normalization of their existence;
- » For online attacks on media organizations' websites and social media accounts;
- » For attacking their opposing groups;
- » For gathering information; and so on.

Taking into consideration all the above mentioned, the media means need to take additional efforts not to become a kind of platform; that is, victims of manipulation and incidental spreaders of ideological propaganda for such groups. To achieve this goal media might need to mobilize its resources. For example, the monitoring and suppression of the activity of such groups on their own media accounts. In reality, there have been many cases when Neo-Nazi group members tried to create their own narrative in an organized way to influence the point of views of Facebook users by being active on this or that media social media account. One of the most well-known practices is the active involvement in commenting during media Facebook live-streams.

Charlie Beckett in the published review of Tow Center of Digital Journalism of the Columbia Journalistic School points out that thanks to an increased amount of disinformation, social media has enlarged the scale and influence of terrorist groups and enabled such groups to get feedback on their published information from their audience (2016). "The journalists who use social media as a platform or a source are not able to always follow the best editorial standards. Social media changed even the feature of terrorism-related news from the point of view of visual materials, eyewitness stories, and live videos. At the same time, it may appear tempting, reasons for the story distorting or focusing on inappropriate details. Journalists are adapting to this new context but there are still practical and policy challenges from verification and evaluation point of view."- Beckett points out (2016:7).

Some problematic issues arising from the use of social networking practice and media challenges by groups related to violent extremism should be marked out and highlighted by journalists:

» Media should be ready and know that groups related to violent extremism will try to use online channels to make a desirable narrative about them appear in the greater media;

» Such groups may attack media social accounts. In order to withstand it, publications should have an elaborate strategy of cyber defense;

» The journalists should take into consideration the simplicity of spreading disinformation by social media. That is why the need for information verification is even more urgent;

» Media should prevent violent groups from using their platforms, including the comment section, to spread their ideology;

» When using Facebook Live, YouTube Livestream, or other similar platforms, the media should act carefully not to become a tribune for hate-motivated groups. Accordingly, during live broadcasting it should explain to the viewer/listener what he or she is watching, what is going on at the place of action, and what he/she needs to know in order to visualize and comprehend the unfolding events.

Charlie Beckett additionally points out that transparency is crucial when the matter comes up to journalism and social media. Social media can be a valuable and important source, but it should always be verified and put into context.

Description of a Case

In 2017, several groups appeared in Georgia with nationalist and anti-immigration aims. On July 14, a part of these groups marched on Aghmashenebeli Avenue and called it "Georgian March." Later on, the "March" name was given to the group that organized it.

The Georgian march was broadcasted live by a number of media means including Radio Liberty, which broadcasted live on YouTube and Facebook accounts. One of these records is still on Radio Liberty's YouTube channel. The video lasts for an hour and fifteen minutes and it shows in detail the whole procession of the march from its beginning to its climax (speeches made by the March organizers). Periodically, we hear xenophobic and discriminatory calls, in-

terviews, expressions, anti-immigration demands of excited people and March organizers. During the whole recording, the journalist makes no comment, does not interfere at all and offers the viewers an unprocessed material of what was going on that day on Aghmashenebeli Avenue.

We will bring some users comments as an example that still can be found on the Radio Liberty's YouTube channel:

"Can't you see that the Arabs and Iranians and others are overwhelmed? Aghmashenebeli has become a filthy place and bad news is elsewhere. If they were demanding the deportation of harmless foreigners, I would not support them. Protecting your own self is not chauvinism let's try to look at it from another point".

"When I see such things, I am proud to be Georgian. Sure, the priority should be foremost a Georgian in our country and then a foreigner as it is in all developed countries. Down with liberalism and treason".
"Only Pederasts and Tatars are against this demonstration…"

Questions for Discussion:

» What kind of information do you think the viewer of this live broadcast would receive? Would he/she get a full picture of what was happening on Aghmashenebeli Avenue?
» How correct was the decision of media to broadcast the procession live alone and to make no comment on it? What did the viewer gain or lack?
» Do you think the media became an accidental propagator of the ideology of these groups with nationalist views in this particular case?
» How could they prevent themselves from it occurring?
» Do you think in such cases the media should somehow limit the comment field to users?
» Do users' comments support a healthy discussion in the community when such issues are broadcasted live?

SHORT DICTIONARY OF TERMS RELATED TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM

1. Far-right Extremism- a form of conservative ideology which has been known to support Neo-Nazism, Racism, and Xenophobia **[5].**

2. DAESHI the same as ISIS – The Islamic State (IS), the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)-a Salafi jihadist armed group and formerly unrecognized proto-state, which follows the Salafist fundamental doctrine of Sunni Islam. It attracted international attention in 2014 when it removed local governmental forces from several important cities of western Iraq and occupied important geographic locations, including the city Mosul and conducted a mass cleansing. The word "Daesh" is mostly used to question the legitimacy of the group, coming from the word's negative connotative meaning.

3. Extremism – union of ideas and ideology which does not recognize the principles of human equality, supports hatred, intolerance, violence, threatens the democratic order of a country and supremacy of law **[6].**

4. White Supremacism – a racist ideology which considers the Caucasian Race to biologically possess natural mental abilities or with innate rights and to be superior to other peoples who do not belong to Caucasian Race. According to some followers of this ideology, the "white race" includes only the Celtic, Germanic and Nordic peoples of Europe; some, however, unite all Caucasian peoples including residents of Eastern Europe and Mediterranean region **[1].**

5. Cyberterrorism – unlawful access to computer information protected by law, its use or threat of use that creates the risk of serious consequences for intimidation of the population and/or for the influence on the authority **[10].**

6. Counter-radicalization – policies and programs to create conditions that will help individuals to avoid being involved in terrorism. It is widely used and includes social, political, legislative, educational, and economic programs specifically created to persuade (presumably already radicalized) individuals not to involve in terrorism **[7].**

7. Counterterrorism – the united effort of policymakers, law enforcement, government officials, **business**es, and NGOs to resist and eliminate terrorism.

8. Counter-terrorist operation – a set of measures aimed at preventing and eliminating terrorist acts, ensuring human security, neutralizing terrorism and minimizing the expected results of terrorist acts and/or other terrorist operations**.**

9. Mujahideen – a Muslim man involved in armed jihad. This term is also used by various Muslim political and paramilitary groups in their own names **[1/7].**

10. Nazism – the ideology, policy and practice of the German National-Socialist Labor Party in Germany from **1919-45;** it may also be recognized as Hitlerism or National Socialism. It is sometimes used to refer to post-WWII fascist groups (see Neo-Nazism). Its aim as a political project was to create the Third German Reich, its ideology had millions of supporters and resulted in the deaths of millions of people **[2].**

11. Nationalism – this term has two key meanings – as an ideology and as a sense. The former is based on the notion of nation and has certain political and cultural goals. The most important of these is the idea of national self-determination. In the latter sense nationalism is the notion which defines that nation and nation-state are of the highest value and that loyalty to this value is superior to all other loyalties; it means that national interests should stand higher than personal, kinship, tribal, class, religious or universal interests **[3].**

12. Neo-Nazism – a political movement that supports the rehabilitation, restoration, and Romanization of German Third Reich ideology. Generally, Neo-Nazis support the overthrow of constitutional democratic rule in favour of a racist, totalitarian state and they consider that violence and terrorism are justified to achieve this goal. The Nazi doctrine which is based on Neo-Nazi ideology has two main views: the superiority of the Indo-European ("Aryan") race and the perception of the Jews as the main enemy of the Aryan race.

13. Neo-Fascism – a political movement that seeks to create an ethnically and racially homogeneous society through the power granted to authoritarian rulers **[4].**

14. Radicalization – when a person while circulating his/her views and supporting a certain ideology may go beyond the limits of law and engaged in terrorist and /or extremist activities. In this process, the willingness of the person to agree and/or if need be resort to violent methods for the goals of the ideology supported by him/her is demonstrated **[6].**

15. Terrorism – violence or threat of use of violence against physical people or legal entities, damage or destruction of buildings, vehicles, communications, and other material objects or the threat of their destruction and damage by using of explosive, nuclear, chemical, biological weapons or other substances hazardous for human life and health. Likewise, the kidnapping of a human or hostage-taking in order to make any government of any of its bodies or an international organization carry out or refrain itself from some certain actions that are against terrorists' interests. For more information about this topic see chapter 1 of this handbook **[9].**

16. Terrorist – a person who participates in a terrorist activity **[9].**

17. Terrorist act – an explosion, setting a fire, attacking a person, using a weapon or any other activity that threatens to kill, cause significant property damage or any other hard consequences that are committed for the purposes of terrorism or threat of a terrorist act **[9].**

18. Terrorist goal – to intimidate the population or to force a government, foreign authority body or international organization to carry out or not carry out this or that activity, or to destabilize or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structure of a country/ foreign country/ international organization.

19. Terrorist organization – an organization (regardless of its form) designed to carry out terrorist activities. An organization may be referred to as a terrorist organization if it is an organized union of more than two people within a specified period. An organized union can be considered the union which is not formed to immediately commit an accidental crime and in which the roles are not distributed among the members, the membership should be of constant character or have a developed structure.

20. Ultra-nationalism – has a more mystical and irrational basis than nationalism. It takes radical xenophobia as an ideology and thinks that foreigners are not perfect people. This ideology equals citizenship to ethnicity and subordinates an individual to the belief of the supremacy of the nation. Ultra-nationalism is a racist ideology, which can be expressed in various ways through mythologization of a specific period of the past with the intense use of vulgar forms of physical anthropology, genetics, and eugenics in order to rationalize its own views **[2].**

21. Fascism – the term originated from the bunch of branches used by the magistrates in the Roman Empire to symbolize the unity of people (the "fascios"), into which an axe (symbol of government) was put. Fascism is an ideology of far-right radical nationalists who strive to totalitarianism. In Western Literature, fascism can be understood as a military form of extreme nationalism, which in any way encouraged the outbreak of was to achieve the state's foreign goals. The first fascist movement that came to power in Europe (1922) was an Italian fascist organization lead by Mussolini. Its related movements were: the German National Socialists, the Spanish Falangists, and the "Action Française" movement in France. The fascist ideology is characterized by the glorification of one's own nation and the assertion of its distinctiveness from all other nations and the uniqueness of its culture **[3].**

22. Sharia – Code of Islamic law. The great law which has the status of state law in the "Islamic Countries".

23. Jihad – a term used in Islam, variously translated as "suffering," "striving," or "holy war." Violent Islamic groups translate it as "holy war" and use it to justify their involvement in violent conflicts against non-Muslim peoples. For some Muslims, the term has an offensive connotation **[5/7].** At least three different groups used the term in the sense of the holy war: Hezbollah, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad **[1].**

24. Jihadism – the belief that the use of jihad is required to achieve the goals of Islam. The Muslim Brotherhood, the founders Al-Qaeda, and Sayyid Qutab believe that jihad against non-Muslims should be the individual responsibility of every Muslim person **[5].**

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